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IN TilE SUPREHE COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15687 
PAUL DAVID VAN DYKE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crime of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury, the Honorable Dean E. 
Conder, presiding. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and 
the court sentenced appellant to a term of five years to life 
to run consecutively with appellant's prior sentences. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below. 
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STATEI1ENT OF FACTS 
on October 8, 1977, at approximately 11:20 p.m., 
the Villa Theatre, located at 3092 Highland Drive, Salt 
Lake County, was robbed by appellant, Kirt Moyes and Randy 
Reid (Tr.78-81). 
Appellant and Moyes entered the theatre armed with 
.45 caliber pistols which were subsequently seized at 
appellant's residence the same night (Tr.36,78,83,184-186). 
They ordered an employee to put the theatre's cash receipts 
in a laundry bag (Tr.37-39). The laundry bag, the small 
bags from the theatre which contained the cash and coins, 
and a note written by the employee, were recovered that 
night from Moyes' room (Tr.l82-184,40-44). The appellant 
and Moyes left the th~3tre and jumped into Randy Reid's 
red 1977 Cutlass automobile. Patrons of a lounge just 
north of the theatre observed a man wearing a ski mask enter 
a late model red car. The patrons noted the license number 
of the car as RJD 58. A Salt Lake City police officer 
observed a red Cutlass, license number RJD458 enter the 
garage of appellant's residence approximately 30 minutes 
later (Tr.l54). Reid drove to another car where the money 
(in the laundry bag), weapons and clothing were transferred 
from Reid's car to the other (Tr.Bl-83,88). Both cars 
returned to appellant's residence (all the participants 
-2-
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lived at the residence in Bountiful, although appellant 
paid the rent (Tr.lll)), and arrived within minutes of 
each other (Tr.84). The weapons and money were transferred 
from the car to the house and the money was counted (Tr.88). 
Appellant's residence was under surveillance when 
the participants returned from the theatre. Police, 
approximately five hours later, pursuant to a search 
warrant issued by Justice of the Peace John A. Stewart, 
searched the residence and recovered the weapons mentioned 
earlier, cash, a laundry bag, and money bags from the 
Villa Theatre (Tr.4,181-186,192,20l). 
During trial appellant moved to suppress evidence 
seized pursuant to t"he search warrant on the grounds, inter 
alia, that Judge Stewart was not a law-trained judge (Tr.7). 
That motion was denied (Tr.32). Appellant also moved for 
a mistrial because the testimony of two witnesses allegedly 
prejudiced him (Tr.69-73,172,187-191). The court struck 
the answer of one witness and cautioned the jury concerning 
the testimony (Tr.l72). The motions for mistrial were 
denied (Tr. 73,191). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED BY JUDGE STEWART WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY AND STATUTORILY VALID. 
-3-
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Appellant argues that the search warrant in 
this case was invalid because it was issued by a Justice 
of the Peace who is not a lawyer. This argument has 
no support in statute, case law or the Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-l (1953), as amended, 
defines "search warrant:" 
"A search warrant is an order 
in writing, in the name of the 
State, signed by a magistrate and 
directed to a peace officer, 
commanding him to search for 
personal property and bring it 
before the magistrate." (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-10-5 (1953), as amended, 
identifies whlch ~2:c~-s are magistrates: 
"The following persons are 
magistrates: 
(l) Justices of the Supreme Court. 
(2) Judges of the district courts. 
(3) Judges of the city courts. 
(4) Justices of the peace." (Emphasis added. 
Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242 
(1943), construed the precursors of Sections 77-54-l and 
77-10-5, Section 105-54-l, R.s.u. 1933 and 105-10-5, R.s.u. 1' 
and held that, "A justice of the peace has power to issue 
search warrants." 
Despite the holdiwj of Allen v. Holbro_?k, supra, 
appellant contends that by analogy Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-4 
(1953), as amended, requires that only law-trained judges 
issue search warrants. This analogy is flawe~ and 
unpcrsuusivc. 
-4-
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Section 78-5-4 deals specifically and narrowly 
with the right to be tried by a law-trained judge 
whenever a jail sentence may be imposed. By statute, 
the legislature determined that certain changes in the 
jurisdiction and power of justices of the peace was 
warranted. Legislation is the proper way to change the 
jurisdiction and power of a magistrate. If a change 
such as appellant proposes has merit it should be 
considered and enacted by the law-making body of govern-
ment. The same argument applies to appellant's reference 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-12-l (1953), as amended, which 
discusses issuance of arrest warrants. 
Appellant cites Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 
207 (Utah 1976), to show that justices of the peace should 
handle minor cases. Shelmidine is instructive on other 
points as well and has direct application to the present 
case. 
In Shelmidine, three petitioner's attacked by extra-
ordinary writ the right of a non-lawyer justice of the peace to 
proceed with their cases because there were potential 
jail sentences. A district judge issued the writ and 
the defendant justice of the peace appealed. This Court 
found the writ was improperly issued and subject to 
recall. The Court noted, however, that since filing of 
the writ a statute had passed requiring law-trained judges 
-5-
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to hear cases involving jail sentences and re~anded the 
cases for trial consistent with the new statute. 
Justice Crockett writing for the Court observed: 
"Also, it should be borne in 
mind that there is a definite 
distinction between a change in 
interpretation or application of 
a statute, which sometimes quite 
justifiably occurs, and attempting 
by judicial fiat to affect a 
substantial change in law as clearly 
expressed in a statute or the con-
stitution. When such a substantial 
change is necessary or desirable, our 
constitution has set up procedures---
for the change by the legislature, 
or of the constitution, by the 
amendment process." (Emphasis 
added.) 550 P.2d at 210. 
The Court also stated: 
"For the reasons stated herein 
we are unable to agree with the 
ruling of the district judge that 
the portion of our own constitution 
which vested the challenged power 
in justices of the peace, is itself 
unconstitutional." 550 P.2d at 211. 
Following the language of Shelmidine,respondent 
asserts that the issuance of search warrants by non-lawyer 
justices of the peace is not unconstitutional. The 
issuance in this case was valid and consistent with 
statute and authoritative case law. 
Appellant points to the nighttime search provision 
of the warrant in this case to support his contention that 
-6-
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only a law-trained judge should issue search warrants. 
Appellant correctly states the law in Utah 
concerning nighttime searches and State v. Treadway, 
28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972), correctly construes 
the statute. However, appellant's statement that, "The 
affidavit in the instant case did not so indicate [positiveness) 
(Appellant's brief, P. 6), is inaccurate. The trial 
found the warrant and supporting affidavit to be sufficiently 
positive to justify denying appellant's motion to quash the 
warrant (Tr.32). There is no testimony rebutting the 
positive nature of the affidavit. The transcript reveals 
that appellant's trial counsel characterized the affidavit 
as insufficiently positive and the state characterized it 
as sufficiently positive. The trial court was in the best 
position to determine the validity of the warrant and its 
decision should not be reversed absent a showing of abuse 
of discretion. Appellant does not claim nor show any 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Appellant posits a general contention which seems 
to be that only law-trained judges can adequately understand 
and determine complex issues of law and therefore are the 
only ones who should be permitted to issue search warrants. 
This contention ignores the role which magistrates play in 
issuing search warrants. 
-7- t 
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Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 407 U.S. 
345 {1972), establishes two tests which magistrates 
issuing warrants must meet. They must be {1) neutral and 
detached and {2) capable of determining whether probable 
cause exists. 92 s.ct. at 2123. 
Coury v. United States, 246 F.2d 1354 {6th Cir. 
1970), stated concerning search warrants and those who 
issue them: 
"[O]nly a probability of 
criminal conduct need be shown; 
the rules for determining probable 
cause are less rigorous than the 
rules of evidence; the commissioner 
[United States Commissioner] should be 
guided by common sense, and 'great 
deference' should be given to the 
co!TlJl'issioner's determination of 
probable cause." 426 F.2d at 1356. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The requirements of a warrant in Utah are found 
in Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-3 {1953), as amended. This section 
repeats the probable cause and particularity standards 
found in the United States Constitution. 
The justice of the peace in this case satisfies the 
tests of Shadwick and Coury. The fact that Judge Stewart is 
not a lawyer does not make him incapable of determining 
probable cause. Non-lawyer juries are constantly asked 
to decide complex and subtle issues under a standard of 
proof much more rigorous than probable cause. 
-8-
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Police can make searches and arrests without 
warrants under certain circumstances. Police decisions 
of this kind often involve complex factual and legal 
issues and must be made immediately and under conditions 
of stress. No constitutional or statutory provision 
requires that police be law-trained. 
Statutes, case law and common sense indicate 
that the magistrate in this case had jurisdiction to 
issue a search warrant. The warrant was valid and legally 
executed. Appellant's contention to the contrary is 
without merit and does not justify reversal in this 
case. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT CQ}frHT ERROR IN ADHITTING 
TESTIMONY ABOUT APPELLANT. 
Appellant refers to two witnesses whose testimony 
constituted prejudicial error. Respondent maintains that 
neither witnesses' testimony was error and even if error, 
such testimony was harmless error not justifying reversal. 
The testimony of the first witness is found in 
appellant's brief at pp. 7-8. This testimony was admissible 
under at least two theories. 
-9-
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Under Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence 
that a person committed a crime on a specified occasion is 
admissible to prove absence of mistake or accident, motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity, 
The testimony in this case established motive for the crime 
in question and was relevant to the issues of intent, prepar~ 
tion and knowledge. See also State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 
1233 (Utah 1975). 
Moreover, the general nature of testimony, "they 
had been hitting a few rinky-dink places" is not evidence 
of a crime committed on a specified occasion and therefore 
is not within the proscription of Rule 55. 
Ap~eiia~t's counsel also elicited similar 
testimony fro~ the witness on cross-examination. Mr. Reid 
in response to counsel's question stated, "I said hitting 
a bigger place possibly like the Villa." Counsel then 
said, "Oh. Well, what did you think hitting a bigger 
place meant." (Tr.ll6). 
The use of the comparative "bigger" suggests 
other smaller robberies. Yet this testimony was given 
during cross-examination and repeated by appellant's 
counsel. 
Any possible error, therefore, was compounded 
and reiterated by appellant. Appellant should not he 
-10-
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allowed to claim error where he contributes to it. 
The testimony would also be admissible as a 
declaration against interest under Rule 63(10) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Under that rule, statements 
by a declarant who is unavailable as a witness are 
admissible if they subject him to criminal liability 
under circumstances which indicate the statements were 
true. Aprellant's statementstoBr. Reid are of this 
nature and were therefore properly admitted. 
The testimony of the second witness, appellant's 
girlfriend, Maria Newman, is found at Tr. 161-179. 
A reading of the complete testimony shows that 
the witness made several statements about the appellant 
referring, on the night of the robbery, to "going to work." 
(Tr.l68,17l,l77). The State's question at issue here and 
the witness' answer could be viewed as explaining what 
appellant meant and the witness understood by "going to 
work." It could also be viewed as an attempt to establish 
how appellant paid cash for groceries. 
Respondent submits that such testimony was 
admissible. The trial court, however, viewed it differently 
and immediately struck the answer and instructed the jury 
to disregard it (Tr.l72). This action by the court cured 
any possible error or prejudice which may have occurred. 
-11-
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Appellant cites State v. Gooc1_!i£~, Utah (No. 
15363, decided May 1, 1978) to support his claim that Maria 
Newman's testimony was prejudicial. Goodliffe is not like 
this case and inapplicable. 
In Goodliffe, a forcible sexual abuse case, the 
trial court permitted testimony of three prior similar 
bad acts committee by the appellant as rebuttal on the 
issue of appellant's truthfulness and veracity. This 
Court noted that while the testimony was admitted on the 
issue of truthfulness and veracity, "the clear implication 
of the testimony was that it was an attempt to demonstrate 
defendant's prope2sity to commit sexual crimes of the 
nature he is ~~es~-:!y charged with." 
Following this observation the Court made the 
statement quoted in appellant's brief. 
Appellant cites three cases for the proposition 
that a mistrial will be granted when the prosecution 
intentionally elicits inadmissible testimony. The cases 
are distinguishable and provide no authority for appellant's 
position. 
In State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P.2d 112 
(1941), a witness mentioned another arrest of the defendant. 
The trial court struck the answer and admonished the jury 
to disregard it. This Court found no error but did suggest 
in dicta that the trial court might have declared a mistrial 
-12-
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if it were sh01·m that the testimony was an attempt to 
introduce a prejudicial reference to another crime. Such 
is not the case here. The dicta of Hartman is not authority 
and the conduct of the prosecution has not and was not 
shown or alleged to be an intentional effort to introduce 
prejudicial references to other crimes. In fact, the 
challenged testimony of Mr. Reid is similar to the 
unresponsive answer of the witness in Hartman. 
State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 30, 282 P.2d 323 
(1955), was a death penalty case. This Court found that 
the cumulative effect of several errors at trial required 
reversal. This Court noted, in dicta, that deliberate 
introduction of hearsay statements, by the state, which 
implied that the defendant threatened the victim on several 
occasions interfered with a fair trial. This Court further 
observed, however, that the manner of eliciting the 
objectionable testimony was not controlling. 282 P.2d at 
330. 
In State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976), this 
Court in commenting on references to the defendant's former 
incarceration at the Utah State Prison stated, "It does 
not appear that the prosecution sought to elicit the 
information," and found the denial of a motion for mistrial 
to be prorer. 
-13-
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The State in this case did not deliberately or 
intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony. The trial 
court struck one answer and instructed the jury to 
disregard it. The other testimony was admissible under 
Rules 55 and 6 3 ( 10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. No 
error occurred because of the testimony and no prejudice 
resulted. 
CONCLUSION 
The search warrant issued in this case was 
valid and evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was 
properly admitted. 
Testimony concerning other bad acts coi!lf'litted 
by appellant was either admissible or properly excluded 
by the trial ·:nnre '·."th appropriate admonition to the jury. 
No prejudice resulted from such testimony and appellant's 
conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-14-
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